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This article analyses the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice on permanent
establishments to determine the
responsibilities of Member States and their
limits in respect of cross-border loss relief from
the home state’s perspective. The article
reveals apparent inconsistencies and
endeavours to answer open questions in this
regard.
1. Introduction
Losses play an important role in tax law as a source for
minimizing tax liability. This is especially true in an
international context, where enterprises may try to
transfer their profits and losses to reach a minimal over-
all tax liability. Naturally, governments wish to protect
their revenue and, therefore, restrict multinational
enterprises regarding “exporting” profits to other juris-
dictions and “importing” losses into their home state.
These restrictions have been under close scrutiny by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) for both international
group structures and permanent establishments (PEs).
This article is primarily concerned with the ECJ’s juris-
prudence on the latter issue; the first issue is discussed
only in as far as it is necessary to understand the princi-
ples created and applied by the Court. It is questionable
how far the ECJ has restricted the Member States’ ability
to devise their tax systems with regard to losses incurred
by foreign PEs of resident taxpayers. Consequently, the
objective of this article is to analyse the responsibilities
of Member States and their limits in this respect as can
be derived from the ECJ’s judgements.
Despite claims that the matter has basically been settled
in favour of the Member States in the recent ECJ deci-
sions Deutsche Shell (C-293/06),1 Lidl Belgium (C-414/
06)2 and Krankenheim (C-157/07),3,4 it can be demon-
strated that several issues remain unresolved, as the
Court’s decisions are open to criticism with regard to
both reasoning and result. Most importantly, the ECJ
has failed to explain clearly the difference between dis-
criminatory and non-discriminatory behaviour of the
home state regarding foreign PE losses. It is, therefore, a
further objective of this article to provide criticism
regarding the question of justification and the applica-
tion of the proportionality test. It is submitted that the
ECJ is wrong to disregard the cash flow disadvantages
inflicted on the taxpayers as a consequence of discrimi-
natory provisions. In the author’s view, the “allocation
of taxing power” cannot justify this treatment. Member
States should not be allowed to draw a line of distinction
between temporal and final losses with regard to loss
relief – the line should be drawn along the difference of
discriminatory versus non-discriminatory treatment.
The following analysis is concerned with the question of
choice of Member States in applying the exemption
method to foreign PE income. There are two different
approaches available for the treatment of losses, which
are both in use and equally correct from the point of
view of international tax law.5 On the one hand, the
“symmetric” approach results in the “exemption” of
losses as well as profits, thereby disallowing taxpayers to
offset their foreign branch losses. The “asymmetric”
approach, on the other hand, includes foreign losses
into the domestic tax base and prevents the double use
of losses by recapturing foreign profits in later years.6
The source state view on PE losses is not discussed. In
this respect, the ECJ has long made clear that Member
States are allowed to restrict relief to losses that are eco-
nomically linked to activities carried on under their jur-
isdiction following the principle of territoriality.7
However, the same is not necessarily true for a Member
State in its role as state of residence.8 This appears to be
clear from the fact that almost all Member States apply
worldwide taxation to their resident companies. They
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1. Case C-293/06, Deutsche Shell (28 February 2008).
2. Case C-414/06, Lidl Belgium (15 May 2008).
3. Case C-157/07 Krankenheim (23 October 2008).
4. In this respect, see, for example, Gerard T.K. Meussen, “The ECJ’s Jud-
gement in Krankenheim – The Last Piece in the Cross-Border Loss Relief Puz-
zle?”, European Taxation 7 (2009), p. 361; Tiago Pedro Rodrigues, “Cross-
Border Loss Relief Jurisprudence”, The EC Tax Journal (2008), p. 46 et seq.;
and Laurent Leclercq and Pauline Trédaniel, “Impact of the ECJ’s Judgement
in Lidl Belgium on the Deduction of Foreign Branch Losses in France”, Bulle-
tin for International Taxation 5/6 (2009), p. 240.
5. For a detailed theoretical analysis of the effect of the different
approaches in applying the exemption method and the credit method on loss
relief, as well as an empirical analysis of the methods used by Member States,
see Tigran Mkrtchyan, “In Search of Ariadne’s Thread: Permanent Establish-
ments and Losses in the European Union”, Bulletin for International Taxation
12 (2009), p. 586 et seq.
6. Currently, five Member States appear to follow this approach and nine
Member States apply a symmetric approach. See Confédération Fiscale Eur-
opéenne, “Opinion Statement of the CFE ECJ Taskforce on Losses Compen-
sation within the EU for Individuals and Companies Carrying Out Their
Activities through Permanent Establishments”, European Taxation 10 (2009),
p. 488. See also Mkrtchyan, supra note 5.
7. See Case C-250/95, Futura Participations and Singer (15 May 1997),
Paras. 18 et seq.
8. For a contrasting opinion, see Meussen, supra note 4, p. 234.
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cannot, therefore, invoke the principle of territoriality
to justify discrimination of resident taxpayers.9
2. ECJ Case Law on Cross-Border Group Relief –
Results and Expectations for PE Losses
The ECJ’s “modern” jurisdiction on foreign losses starts
with the landmark decision in Marks & Spencer (C-446/
03).10 This case concerned a multinational group par-
ented in the United Kingdom with several loss-making
subsidiaries resident in other Member States. The par-
ent of the group, Marks & Spencer plc, claimed relief for
the losses incurred by the subsidiaries in France, Bel-
gium and Germany, all of which had already been sold
or ceased trading by that time.11 As only resident subsi-
diaries could surrender losses under UK tax law, the
claim was denied by the UK Revenue, before the case
was referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
Following along the lines of the Advocate-General
Poiares Maduro’s Opinion, the ECJ identified a forbid-
den restriction in the fact that the cash flow advantage
conferred on a merely domestic group by granting it
accelerated loss relief was unobtainable for a parent
company with regard to its foreign subsidiaries, as the
provision was “of such a kind as to hinder the exercise
by that parent company of its freedom of establishment
by deterring it from setting up subsidiaries in other
Member States” and “[t]hus constitutes a restriction on
freedom of establishment”.12
In the author’s view, it is immaterial that the ECJ found
a “hindrance” or “restriction”, rather than “discrimina-
tion”.13 The ECJ used terminology inconsistently; it is
commonly understood, however, that a different treat-
ment of comparable situations is prima facie “discrimi-
natory”. In Marks & Spencer, the ECJ, indeed, compared
the taxation of a company with a domestic subsidiary
with a company with a foreign subsidiary and, therefore,
implicitly accepted the two to be in a comparable situa-
tion.14 It is submitted that the term “discrimination” or
“discriminatory restriction” should have been used
there to clarify the distinction to cases where a restric-
tion does not follow from different treatment of com-
parable situations.
The ECJ went on to discuss possible justifications fol-
lowing its familiar “rule of reason doctrine”.15 The ECJ
considered several grounds of justification brought for-
ward by the Member States and finally concluded that
three of these, taken together, were suitable to justify the
restriction in question: the aim of preserving the
balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes, the
danger that losses might be used twice, and the risk of
tax avoidance.16 This reasoning deserves some atten-
tion.
For the first time, the ECJ accepted a combination of
several grounds of justification, where one of these – the
balanced allocation of taxing power – was newly created
in the judgement itself and the two others would not
normally have survived the strict proportionality test
put forward by the ECJ in other decisions.17 Accord-
ingly, the by far most important ground of justification
must be seen in the balanced allocation of taxing power,
which, in the ECJ’s view, would be “significantly jeopar-
dised” by giving companies:
the option to have their losses taken into account in the Mem-
ber State in which they are established or in another Member
State..., as the taxable basis would be increased in the first State
and reduced in the second to the extent of the losses trans-
ferred.18
The ECJ ignored the lengthy discussion of the Advo-
cate-General regarding the principle of fiscal cohesion,
which it had rejected in its preceding judgement in ICI
(C-264/96).19 The difference between the two cases does
not explain the lack of discussion of the principle of fis-
cal cohesion by the ECJ after the Advocate-General had
accepted this in his Opinion. One possible explanation
for this curious fact is that the ECJ implicitly presumed
both grounds of justification to be somewhat exchange-
able.20
9. See Wolfgang Schön, “Losing Out at the Snooker Table: Cross-Border
Loss Compensation for PEs and the Fundamental Freedoms”, in Luc Hinne-
kens and Philippe Hinnekens (eds.), A Vision of Taxes within and outside Eur-
opean Borders, Festschrift in Honor of Prof. Frans Vanistendael (Alphen aan
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2008), p. 815 et seq.
10. Case C-446/03,Marks & Spencer (13 December 2005).
11. Id., Para. 21.
12. Id., Para. 33 et seq.
13. The only apparent difference between the concept of discrimination
(or: discriminatory restriction of the fundamental freedoms) and a (non-dis-
criminatory) restriction lies in the applicability of grounds of justification not
explicitly mentioned in the EC Treaty. This difference, however, is becoming
less obvious as it is not consistently applied by the ECJ. In this respect, see
Case C-136/00, Advocate-General’s Opinion, Danner (21 March 2002), Paras.
36-40; for a sceptical view on the inconsistent case law, see C-446/03, Advo-
cate-General’s Opinion, Marks & Spencer (7 April 2005), Para. 33. It appears
that the ECJ most often uses the term “restriction” when concerned with out-
bound cases, confining the use of the term “discrimination” to proceedings
against the source state.
14. A “vertical” comparison or “migrant/non-migrant test”. In this regard,
compare Tom O’Shea, “Marks and Spencer v Halsey (HM Inspector of Taxes):
restriction, justification and proportionality”, EC Tax Review (2006), p. 82.
The assumption of comparability can also be derived from the ECJ’s rejection
of the territoriality principle as justifying the infringement (C-446/03, Marks
& Spencer, Para. 40): the underlying notion of this is that the different tax
treatment of two subsidiaries resident in different countries does not lead to
incomparable situations.
15. C-446/03,Marks & Spencer, Para. 35.
16. Id., Paras. 42 et seq. and 51.
17. The second ground of justification – the potential double use of losses –
would have had to fail the proportionality test, as Member States are able to
resolve the problem by relying on the Mutual Assistance Directive (77/799/
EEC) to establish whether losses have been taken into account in the other
Member State (see Pedro Rodrigues, supra note 4, p. 33). Equally, the third
reason used by the ECJ – tax avoidance – has consistently been rejected in
cases where the provisions in question were not specifically tailored to pre-
vent “wholly artificial arrangements”. In this respect, see, for example, Case
C-264/96, ICI (16 July 1998), Para. 26 and Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes
(12 September 2006), Para. 51 et seq. The ECJ even noted this line of case law
in C-446/03,Marks & Spencer, Para. 57, but did not use it in the usual way.
18. C-446/03,Marks & Spencer, Para. 46.
19. C-264/96, ICI (16 July 1998).
20. In its discussion of the ground of justification, the ECJ also appears to
have the Advocate-General’s argument regarding loss trafficking as a threat
to the cohesion of the tax systems in mind, who argued in C-446/03, Advo-
cate General’s Opinion,Marks & Spencer: “Certainly this risk [of ‘loss traffick-
ing’, a/n] must not be overlooked. Nor, however, should it be overestimated.
It is readily dealt with by the requirement that the benefit of the relief is sub-
ject to the condition that the losses of foreign subsidiaries cannot receive
advantageous tax treatment in the State in which those subsidiaries are resi-
dent” (Para. 79). The notion of exchangeability of the two concepts appears
even more convincing after the judgements in C-414/06, Lidl Belgium and C-
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The even more interesting part of the judgement, how-
ever, lies in the arguments used in the proportionality
test, which is astonishingly short. In only five para-
graphs the ECJ explained that the restrictive measure
went beyond what was necessary to attain the objectives
of overriding interest where “the non-resident subsidi-
ary has exhausted the possibilities available in its State
of residence of having the losses taken into account”
and “there is no possibility for the foreign subsidiary’s
losses to be taken into account in its State of residence
for future periods”.21 This argumentation mirrors the
Advocate-General’s reasoning in Para. 79 of his Opinion
inMarks & Spencer with regard to fiscal cohesion:
Where the State in which the foreign subsidiaries are estab-
lished enables those subsidiaries to impute their losses to
another person or to carry them forward to other financial
years, the United Kingdom is entitled to oppose a claim for the
transnational transfer of those losses.
However, the ECJ went even further in reducing the
legal requirement enshrined in the fundamental free-
doms that a restriction must not go further than neces-
sary to achieve a justifiable purpose by stating
“Furthermore, in so far as it may be possible to identify
other, less restrictive measures, such measures in any
event require harmonization rules adopted by the Com-
munity legislature”.22 As a result, the ECJ set a rather
arbitrary standard of when losses have to be taken into
account in complete disregard of the remaining cash
disadvantage, which is conferred on the taxpayer by
postponing loss relief to some future point. This stan-
dard also appears to be arbitrary from the point of view
of the home state, as the group can manipulate the “fin-
ality” of its losses by liquidating or selling a subsidiary to
trigger a loss offset.
The second important ECJ case (Oy AA (C-231/05))23
concerned a profitable Finnish company, Oy AA, whose
UK parent company incurred losses. Oy AA wished to
deduct payments made to its financially troubled parent
under the Finnish “group contribution regime”, which
according to the Finnish provisions was only available
for domestic companies.
In this case, the ECJ had no difficulty to identify a (dis-
criminatory) restriction of the freedom of establishment
in the “domestic entity”, which was a requirement of the
Finnish regime. In the next step, it applied the argu-
ments for justification established in Marks & Spencer,
accepting a combination of only two of the three factors
as sufficient.24 Again, the more important and poten-
tially convincing argument (due to a lack of opposing
previous case law) was the balanced allocation of taxing
power.25 The proportionality analysis advanced by the
ECJ was even shorter than in its preceding judgement.
In one paragraph the ECJ noted a list of possible condi-
tions which could be set to reach a less restrictive
approach, but even before that the Court had already
concluded that:
any extension of that advantage to cross-border situations
would... have the effect of allowing groups of companies to
choose freely the Member State in which their profits will be
taxed.26
Accordingly, the ECJ held the Finnish exclusion of for-
eign companies from the beneficial group contribution
regime to be justified under any circumstances, going
beyond its judgement in Marks & Spencer, where the
exclusion was only justified under the condition that
losses are available for relief in another Member State.
The ECJ was apparently more willing to accept the
exclusion in this case, as the Finnish regime was more
far-reaching in its effects domestically. This is a curious
result indeed, as Finland would not necessarily have to
extend all domestically available benefits to foreign
companies.27 In order to reconcile Marks & Spencer and
Oy AA, it is probably necessary to consider a rather for-
mal difference between them. Specifically, the ECJ sta-
ted that Oy AA was not concerned with the question of
deductibility of losses and even less so with “final
losses”, which was the deciding factor for the outcome
of Marks & Spencer.28 In effect, the ECJ did not consider
the issue of “importing losses”, as in Marks & Spencer,
but the issue “exporting profits”, which indeed appears
to be different and may justify a more restrictive
approach.29
The conclusions to be drawn from these judgements can
be divided into two. In respect of rather general devel-
opments of importance regarding the status of direct tax
provisions in EC law, at least two have to be stated here:
the concept of taking several justifications together and
the creation of the “balanced allocation of taxing
power”. Both are integral parts of the ECJ’s subsequent
case law. Nonetheless, both innovations remain some-
what obscure from these early judgements, as the ECJ
did not explain how many grounds of justifications have
to accompany the argument on allocation of taxing
power, nor did it clearly define the essential meaning of
the justification.30
In respect of more the specific issue of cross-border loss
relief, it appears to be clear from the ECJ’s decisions that
the fundamental freedoms do not generally require the
Member States to give relief for losses incurred by for-
157/07, Krankenheim. See Michael Lang, “Recent Case Law of the ECJ on
Direct Taxation: Trends, Tensions and Contradictions”, EC Tax Review
(2009), p. 109.
21. C-446/03,Marks & Spencer, Para. 55.
22. Id., Para. 58. See also the critical remarks of Timothy Lyons, “Marks &
Spencer: something for everyone?”, British Tax Review (2006), p. 12.
23. Case C-231/05, Oy AA (18 July 2007).
24. Id., Para. 60.
25. Id., Para. 62 et seq. The ECJ explicitly stated that the second justification
would not have applied on its own.
26. Id., Para. 64.
27. See Werner C. Haslehner, “Group Relief for Losses – ECJ in Deviation
to Marks & Spencer?”, Steuer und Wirtschaft International (2007), p. 443 et
seq.
28. In this respect, the considerations of Advocate-General Kokott are illu-
minating. See C-231/05, Advocate-General Opinion, Oy AA (12 September
2006), Para. 71.
29. Compare Anno Rainer, “Anmerkung zum EuGH-Urteil Oy AA”, Inter-
nationales Steuerrecht (2007), p. 635 et seq.
30. See Joachim Englisch, “Limitation of Fundamental Freedoms to Safe-
guard the Allocation of the Power to Impose Taxes”, Steuer und Wirtschaft
International (2008), p. 399.
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eign subsidiaries of resident companies. However,
under certain circumstances, the denial of loss relief
becomes disproportionate and thus a forbidden infrin-
gement. The conditions to render a Member States’ jus-
tification ineffective in this regard are commonly
referred to with the term “final” (or “terminal”) losses.
This term is not without problems. Especially, it appears
to make the obligation of the state of residence of the
parent company conditional on the loss relief rules
implemented in the subsidiary’s state of residence.31
It is now crucial to ask what can be derived from that
case law for losses incurred by foreign PEs. In addition
to the remaining uncertainty regarding the principles
established, the question is whether or not the principles
can be readily applied to that situation. This should
prima facie depend on whether the situations are com-
parable. However, in his Opinion on Marks & Spencer,
Advocate-General Poiares Maduro clearly rejected the
notion of comparability of subsidiaries and PEs from
the home state perspective: “the difference in treatment
of those two categories of establishments... stems from a
difference in the tax regimes applicable to the different
types of establishment”32 and “the provisions on free-
dom of establishment do not preclude different tax
treatment from being accorded to legal or natural per-
sons in different legal situations”.33
The ECJ apparently adopted the same position, as it did
not oppose the Advocate-General’s opinion in this
point. This is not absolutely clear, though. Specifically, it
can be argued that there was no need for the ECJ to dis-
cuss this detail,34 as it was sufficient to use the “migrant
and/or non-migrant” test to reach its conclusion.35 It
must also be taken into account that the Advocate-Gen-
eral’s rejection of the “horizontal” (or cross-legal form)
comparison36 in that case was based on a comparative
analysis of the UK provisions on group relief and on
domestic branch taxation. In particular, Advocate-Gen-
eral Poiares Maduro concluded that:
Groups of companies are not entitled to consolidation for tax
purposes which applies to the income of PEs. [Thus] the group
relief system... cannot have the effect of assimilating the situa-
tion of subsidiaries to that of branches. Under that regime the
transfer of losses is treated in a specific way. There is no consoli-
dated joint taxation.37
This line of reasoning obviously cannot apply for cases
where the underlying group regime provisions work dif-
ferently, especially when there is consolidated joint taxa-
tion. In applying a consolidation system for groups of
companies, the principal distinction in tax treatment
between (domestic) branches and subsidiaries as dis-
cussed by the Advocate-General is abolished, even
though several others may remain, depending on the
particular Member State’s tax regime.38 In the first step,
there is a simple comparison of the tax treatment of two
domestic situations: a single entity with several branches
(i.e. a “branch group”) and a separate-entity group. If
the two situations were treated alike domestically, this
would arguably result in “assimilating the situation of
subsidiaries to that of branches”, making the different
legal forms of establishment comparable in the cross-
border situation.39 If comparability was thus established,
a different treatment of foreign subsidiaries and PE
would prima facie lead to an infringement of EC law.
This implies that Member States applying the credit
method for foreign PEs would also have to include all
losses of foreign subsidiaries (fulfilling the requirements
for being members of a consolidation group) in the con-
solidated tax base.40 On the other hand, Member States
following the symmetric approach in applying the
exemption method for PEs would not be required to do
so, as they also disregard losses incurred by foreign PEs.
In this case, however, one would expect the principle of
allowing “final” losses to be offset in the home state as
derived from Marks & Spencer to apply to final losses
incurred by foreign PEs as well, as comparability argu-
ably has to work both ways.41 That result is not affected
by the fact that Marks & Spencer was decided on the
basis of a “vertical” comparison, as both comparators
may be applicable in one case. If, on the other hand,
branches and subsidiaries are not assimilated in the way
just shown, cross-legal form comparability cannot be
found, making it less obvious to apply the principles
fromMarks & Spencer directly to PEs.
As this analysis reveals, it could have been expected that
the ECJ would consider carefully whether or not the
principles established in Marks & Spencer, especially in
31. See 6.
32. C-446/03, Advocate-General’s Opinion,Marks & Spencer, Para. 48.
33. Id., Para. 49.
34. See Lyons, supra note 22, p. 255, who noted already before the judge-
ment that “it is not clear that the Court will find it necessary to do so”.
35. See O’Shea, supra note 14, p. 82.
36. As has been noted by Michael Lang, “Zum Seminar G: Verbietet das
Gemeinschaftsrecht die Erhebung von Quellensteuern?”, Internationales
Steuerrecht (2009), p. 539, there are different scenarios that are equally called
“horizontal comparison”, making it necessary to distinguish between the clas-
sical “horizontal” comparator, which is applied where a cross-border situation
is compared with another cross-border situation involving a different foreign
country. This approach has recently been accepted by the ECJ in Case C-521/
07, Commission v. Netherlands (11 June 2009). The second “horizontal” com-
parator involves two cross-border situations between the same two countries,
normally involving two different legal forms of establishment. This approach
has been accepted by the ECJ in Case C-253/03, CLT-UFA (23 February
2006) from the host state of view, but is yet unconfirmed from the point of
view of the residence state. I will continue to refer to this latter comparison as
a “cross-legal form” comparison from now on.
37. C-446/03, Advocate-General’s Opinion,Marks & Spencer, Para. 48.
38. See Michael Lang, “Marks and Spencer – more questions than answers:
an analysis of the Opinion delivered by Advocate General Maduro”, EC Tax
Review (2005), p. 96 et seq.
39. This follows from Advocate-General Poiares Maduro’s reasoning (C-
446/03, Advocate-General’s Opinion, Marks & Spencer) e contrario. It must
be acknowledged, however, that this outcome is not supported by any case
law yet; it completely depends on the assumption that applying joint taxation
to companies will make them comparable to branches for tax purposes in the
eyes of the ECJ, which is disputable.
40. Correspondingly, it could of course include foreign profits in the
domestic tax base as well. See Lang, supra note 38, p. 97.
41. Critical of this are Axel Cordewener, Matthias Dahlberg, Pasquale Pis-
tone, Ekkehart Reimer and Carlo Romano, “The Tax Treatment of Foreign
Losses: Ritter, M&S, and the Way Ahead (Part Two)”, European Taxation 5
(2004), p. 232, who claim that this would not be a necessary conclusion from
the ECJ’s case law. However, these authors solely focus on the argument that
the statement “a PE must not be treated worse than a fictitious corporation”
does not automatically imply that a corporation must not be treated worse
than a PE. This surely is correct, but it does not focus on the concept of com-
parability.
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its proportionality analysis, should apply to cases
regarding losses incurred by a foreign PE.42 Unfortu-
nately, the ECJ did not provide any explanation as to
why its reasoning should apply to those cases, even
though it explicitly referred to Marks & Spencer and
decided Lidl Belgium along the same lines.43 In particu-
lar, the ECJ did not consider the question of cross-legal
form comparability and whether or not the existence of
a consolidation group regime could lead to in a different
result.
3. AMID –Does the ECJ KnowHow to Build a
Bridge?
The first case concerned with losses incurred by a PE
from the viewpoint of the home state is a curious one. It
attracted stimulating discussions in academic literature,
with some authors arguing that the ECJ’s reasoning was
flawed (the “wrong bridge”), even though the result of
the case was correct.44 From the point of view of its sub-
sequent case law, however, it is necessary to say that
both reasoning and result were incorrect.
In AMID (C-141/99),45 the ECJ had to consider the Bel-
gian rules regarding a restriction of loss carry-forwards
in the head office due to profits incurred by a PE in Lux-
embourg. Belgium had implemented a rule according to
which the domestic losses would be set off against prof-
its from the foreign PE, which, however, were exempt in
Belgium. By doing so, the losses were not available for a
loss carry-forward in Belgium against the profits attri-
butable to the head office in the following year. Effec-
tively, the offset against exempt profits in the first year
did not yield any relief to AMID. Accordingly, the com-
pany claimed that it constituted a restriction of the free-
dom of establishment, as it deterred them from setting
up a foreign branch. The ECJ basically followed this
claim and held that:
by setting off domestic losses against profits exempted by treaty,
the legislation of that Member State establishes a differentiated
tax treatment as between companies incorporated under
national law having establishments only on national territory
and those having establishments in another Member State.46
The ECJ, therefore, found the situation of a company
with a domestic branch to be comparable to the situa-
tion of a company with a foreign company in respect of
a loss carry-forward.47 This may be correct in principle,
but the ECJ failed to carry out the next step properly. In
the case of a Belgian company with a domestic branch
incurring profits, the losses incurred by the head office
would also be set off against those profits immediately,
and there would be no loss to be carried forward either.
In fact, the Belgian rules treated the foreign PE just as if
it was a domestic PE.48 If the idea of comparability of
companies with domestic branches and those with for-
eign PEs is upheld, there was no discrimination to be
found in the case. Accordingly, a restriction of the free-
dom of establishment could only be found by looking at
the end result. In effect, AMID was subject to double
taxation with regard to its foreign PE profits.49 The ECJ
did not discuss this issue, but according to its later case
law, this negative effect would not constitute an infrin-
gement of EC law.50
Alternatively, discrimination could have arisen from the
fact that Belgium did not heed the effects of the tax
treaty to “treat foreign source-income of its residents
consistently with the way it has divided its tax base”51
from the equal treatment of situations that should be
distinguished on the fact that the cross-border situation
was governed by a tax treaty. It is, however, very clear
from subsequent case law that the mere existence of a
tax treaty and the consequential difference with regard
to the home state’s right to tax foreign activities does
not amount to different situations; it can only work as a
justification.52 Accordingly, in addition to the fact that
the ECJ’s reasoning appears to have already been flawed
at the time of its delivering, even an alternative reason-
ing would, taking later case law into account, not lead to
the same result in this case today.
4. Deutsche Shell – AreMember States Free to
Allocate Currency Losses?
Deutsche Shell again troubled the ECJ with regard to
establishing the right comparator. The case concerned
the rather specific situation of a currency loss arising to
the German Deutsche Shell GmbH through its Italian
PE. The loss became apparent when, after transferring
the PE to a subsidiary and selling its shares, the proceeds
of the sale were set against the start-up capital initially
granted to the PE. Even though the PE itself, as well as
the transaction leading to its dissolution, had been prof-
itable in Italy, the consistent devaluation of the Italian
lira against the German mark resulted in a loss in the
books of the German company. The German tax autho-
rities, however, did not allow the loss to be deducted as
an expense for tax purposes, arguing, inter alia,53 that
the losses formed part of the income attributable to the
Italian PE, which could not be taken into account in
42. Critical is Gunter Mayr, “Moderne Konzernbesteuerung im Lichte der
EuGH-Rechtsprechung”, Betriebs-Berater (2008), p. 1314 et seq.
43. See 5.
44. Compare Luc Hinnekens, “AMID: The Wrong Bridge or a Bridge Too
Far? An Analysis of a Recent Decision of the European Court of Justice”, Eur-
opean Taxation 6 (2001), p. 206 et seq.; John F. Avery Jones, “A Comment on
‘AMID: The Wrong Bridge or a Bridge Too Far?’”, European Taxation 7/8
(2001), p. 251; and Axel Cordewener, Europäische Grundfreiheiten und natio-
nales Steuerrecht (Cologne: Otto Schmidt, 2002), p. 799 et seq.
45. Case C-141/99, AMID (14 December 2000).
46. Id., Para. 23.
47. Id., Para. 29.
48. See Cordewener, supra note 44, p. 794 et seq.
49. Hinnekens, supra note 44, p. 208 et seq. and Cordewener, supra note 44,
p. 795 et seq.
50. Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert and Morres (14 November 2006), Para. 18 et
seq. and Case C-67/08, Block (12 February 2009), Para. 31.
51. Compare Case C-374/04, Advocate-General’s Opinion, ACT Group
Litigation (23 February 2006), Para. 58.
52. C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, Para. 40 et seq. and Case C-347/04, Rewe
Zentralfinanz (29 March 2007), Para. 69. A further, detailed discussion of the
issue is provided in Axel Cordewener, Georg Kofler and Servaas van Thiel,
“EC Fundamental Freedoms and Direct Taxation”, LexisNexis 2010, in pre-
paration.
53. In addition, they argued that the loss could not to be regarded to be a
“real financial loss”. It is not necessary to discuss this issue here, as the ECJ
left it to the national court to decide.
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Germany under the “principle of symmetry”. Had the
company experienced a profit from a shift in exchange
rates, it would equally not be taxed in Germany.54
Deutsche Shell GmbH argued that denying loss relief
constituted an infringement of the freedom of establish-
ment, as it placed it “in a less favourable situation than if
the ‘start-up capital’ had been invested in a company
established in Germany”.55
Implicit in this argument is the idea that the establish-
ment of a domestic branch would constitute a compar-
able situation to the one at issue. It is obvious, however,
that in a mere domestic situation, a currency loss could
never have come into existence. The loss itself can none-
theless not result in a forbidden restriction of a funda-
mental freedom, as it is simply the consequence of the
existence of two different currencies. There is no situa-
tion to be found where a currency loss as a result of the
repayment of start-up capital would be deductible in
Germany. Consequently, Advocate-General Sharpston
and the ECJ refrained from trying to find the right com-
parator and simply concluded that the provisions at
issue constituted a non-discriminatory obstacle (a genu-
ine “restriction”), as the additional financial risk
incurred by Deutsch Shell GmbH. In setting up an Ita-
lian branch, it did not only have to “face the normal
risks associated with setting up such a body, but... an
additional risk of a fiscal nature where it provides start-
up capital for it”.56 It has been argued, however, that the
ECJ did in substance find discrimination to be at hand
in the form of the less often used notion according to
which discrimination can arise through the application
of the same rule to different situations.57 According to
this argument, as the situations of a foreign and a
domestic PE were different with regard to the risk of a
currency loss, Germany would discriminate by not tak-
ing that risk into account in devising its tax system.
However, following this argument appears to be odd, as
it would hold the home state responsible for the exis-
tence of different currencies, which can clearly only be
seen as an irrelevant disparity.
The ECJ then did not accept the symmetry argument
brought forward by the German government as a suita-
ble ground of justification, stating that:
the comparison between the currency losses, on one hand, and
currency gains, on the other, is irrelevant, since there is no
direct relationship between those two elements [as required to
invoke the principle of cohesion, a/n].58
This has been criticized as being too much focused on
the facts of the concrete case and ignoring the aim of the
tax rule.59 The ECJ, however, appears to be consistent in
demanding an actual advantage to offset an actual dis-
advantage to assess the existence of a “direct link”
between the two. Even though currency profits and
losses may be seen as two sides of the same coin, no
such direct link exists between the two as they do not
depend on each other.60 The ECJ, therefore, clearly
rejected the idea of symmetry to be the same thing as
coherency.
Germany had also argued that the non-deductibility was
justified by the fact that it followed from the tax treaty
concluded with Italy and, therefore, was part of the allo-
cation of tax competence between the two Member
States. The ECJ accepted the validity of the ground of
justification in general and stated that:
a Member State cannot be required to take account, for the pur-
poses of applying its tax law, of the negative results of a PE situ-
ated in another Member State which belongs to a company with
a registered office in the first State solely because those negative
results are not capable of being taken into account for tax pur-
poses in the Member State where the PE is situated.61
However, in the case in question, the ECJ did not accept
the currency loss to be a negative result of the PE by stat-
ing it to be “unacceptable for a Member State to exclude
from the basis of assessment of the principal establish-
ment currency losses which, by their nature, can never
be suffered by the PE”.62
In essence, the ECJ explained the limits on when a
Member State can rely on the overriding interest of the
protection of the balanced allocation of taxing power. A
Member State cannot invoke it as a justification with
regard to income that has not been allocated to it in the
tax treaty to prevent double taxation. Currency profits
or losses can never arise in the source state and are,
therefore, never at risk of being subject to double taxa-
tion. Consequently, the decision to exclude both from
the tax base of the German company has to be qualified
as a unilateral one taken by Germany’s domestic law.
Even though the allocation of taxing power itself is out-
side the scope of EC law, its implementation via domes-
tic tax law clearly is not.
In effect, the ECJ’s judgement apparently echoed the
result from Marks & Spencer, increasing the consensus
amongst scholars that the primary distinction with
regard to cross-border loss relief has to be drawn
between “temporary” and “final” losses.63 It remained an
open question, however, whether the ECJ would accept
the cash disadvantage conferred on a taxpayer by disal-
lowing relief for “temporary” losses with regard to for-
54. Neither, it could be added, would it be taxable in Italy, which is unable
to “see” the profit or the loss, both of which only come into existence in the
books kept in Germany. In the case of currency profits, therefore, double
non-taxation arises.
55. C-293/06, Deutsche Shell, Para. 21.
56. Id., Para. 30.
57. See Lang, supra note 38, p. 99.
58. C-293/06, Deutsche Shell, Para. 40.
59. Eric C.C.M. Kemmeren, “Exemption method for PEs and (major) share-
holdings best services: the CCCTB and the internal markets concerned”, EC
Tax Review (2008), p. 132 et seq.
60. This interpretation of the meaning of fiscal cohesion can easily be
inferred from the few judgements where it was actually applied to justify an
infringement of EC law. In this respect, see Case C-204/90, Bachmann (28
January 1992), C-157/07, Krankenheim and Case C-418/ 07, Papillon (27
November 2008) (although in the last case the measure taken by the French
government was too restrictive, the idea of disallowing another deduction for
losses already taken into account was accepted in principle).
61. C-293/06, Deutsche Shell, Para. 42.
62. Id., Para. 44.
63. See Tom O’Shea, “German Currency Loss Rules Incompatible With EU
Law, ECJ Says”,Worldwide Tax Daily (2008), 44-2.
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eign PEs.64 This issue was subsequently under scrutiny
in Lidl Belgium.
5. Lidl Belgium –Marks & Spencer Applied to PEs
This case concerned a simple example of temporary
losses. The German company Lidl Belgium GmbH &
Co KG (“Lidl”) had a PE in Luxembourg, which, in
1999, incurred losses. Lidl sought to set these losses
against its German profits, which was denied by the tax
authorities with reference to the “principle of symme-
try” after the abolition of the exception to this doctrine
in Sec. 2a, Para. 3 of the German Income Tax Code (Ein-
kommensteuergesetz). In its request for a preliminary
ruling on this issue, the German Supreme Court (Bun-
desfinanzhof)65 considered whether the principles
derived fromMarks & Spencer could be applied in effect.
Even though the Court stated that the ruling was not
directly applicable to PEs, it was of the opinion that
there was no material difference with regard to the dis-
advantage and the grounds of justification accepted in
that judgement. In addition, it asked whether the
immediate offset of losses accompanied by a recapture
would have to be regarded as a less restrictive alternative
to the existing German tax rules and, therefore, would
have to be implemented. Advocate-General Sharpston
took this position. Specifically, after applying the princi-
ples from Marks & Spencer to ascertain the existence of
discrimination and possible justifications, she went on
to deny the proportionality of the German principle of
symmetry as:
a deduction-and-recapture rule is unarguably less restrictive of
the taxpayer’s fundamental right of establishment than an out-
right prohibition of deducting from the profits of a company
losses made by a PE in another Member State. At the same time
it is still appropriate for attaining the objectives of preserving
the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes and of
avoiding the danger that losses would be used twice.66
The ECJ did not follow the Advocate-General’s assess-
ment. With regard to the German Supreme Court’s
doubts regarding the applicability of the Marks & Spen-
cer principles because of the different nature of a PE and
a subsidiary, it started its reasoning by stating that a PE
“constitutes, under tax convention law, an autonomous
entity”.67 This presumption clearly is incorrect. The
separate-entity fiction applying to a PE is, for one thing,
a mere fiction, and for another, a fiction which is merely
put up to attribute profits to this fictitious entity from
the point of view of the source state; even there the fic-
tion does not apply without exceptions. With regard to
the home state of the enterprise, the fiction is only
applied to determine the correct amount of profits to be
relieved. Both do not make a PE an autonomous taxable
unit, and even less so from the home state’s point of
view. It is also striking that the ECJ had not referred to
this alleged comparability in Marks & Spencer, where
Advocate-General Poiares Maduro had concluded in his
Opinion that subsidiaries and PEs are not in comparable
situations.68 It would have been convenient had the ECJ
clarified the relationship between the two judgements in
this respect.
However, even without such reference, the establish-
ment of a forbidden (discriminatory) restriction in the
case in question is convincing. The ECJ identified the
immediate offset of losses incurred by domestic PEs to
be a tax advantage, which was not conferred on foreign
PEs, thereby discouraging a German company from car-
rying on its business through a PE in another Member
State.69
After this finding, the ECJ went on to examine possible
justifications and applied two of the three grounds of
justification used in Marks & Spencer: the balanced allo-
cation of taxing power and the possible double use of
losses. Recalling the argument from Marks & Spencer
and Oy AA, the ECJ accepted both arguments to be
applicable.70 With regard to the first justification, this is,
in the author’s view, disputable. The ECJ had explained
in its earlier judgements with regard to the balanced
allocation of taxing power, that it may only be invoked:
“where the system in question is designed to prevent
conduct capable of jeopardising the right of the Member
States to exercise their taxing powers in relation to activ-
ities carried on in their territory”,71 whilst it “cannot in
itself justify a Member State systematically refusing to
grant a tax advantage to a resident parent company, on
the ground that that company has developed a cross-
border economic activity which does not have the
immediate result of generating tax revenues for that
State.”72
This is also the reason why the balanced allocation of
taxing power does not provide for a sufficient justifica-
tion on its own, but requires another justification to
accompany it. In particular, the balanced allocation of
taxing power can only be in jeopardy when there is the
danger that losses are taken into account twice or that a
taxpayer could shift profits freely and choose the Mem-
ber State to tax them. The right to exercise a Member
State’s taxing power is, however, not necessarily in dan-
ger in the case of a PE following the rules agreed on in a
bilateral tax treaty. Such a treaty does not include a rule
that prevents Germany from exercising its right to tax
activities carried on in its territory. Indeed, it may even
assume a right to tax foreign activities to recapture an
64. See Hanno Kube, “Grenzüberschreitende Verlustverrechnung und die
Zuordnung von Verantwortung”, Internationales Steuerrecht (2008), p. 311 et
seq. and Werner C. Haslehner, “ ECJ Judgment in the Deutsche Shell GmbH
Case (C-293/06): Does Community Law Bring an End to the Symmetry Pro-
position?”, Steuer und Wirtschaft International (2008), p. 167.
65. Bundesfinanzhof, 28 June 2006, I R 84/04, BStBl II 2006, 861.
66. C-414/06, Advocate-General’s Opinion, Lidl Belgium (14 February
2008), Para. 25.
67. C-414/06, Lidl Belgium, Para. 21.
68. See 2. Compare also the criticism provided by Oliver Dörfler and Mar-
tin Ribbrock, “Negierung der Inländergleichbehandlung bei Nichtberück-
sichtigung ausländischer Betriebsstättenverluste – Verletzung fundamentaler
Besteuerungsprinzipien”, Betriebs-Berater (2008), p. 653 et seq.
69. C-414/06, Lidl Belgium, Para. 23 et seq.
70. Id., Para. 37 et seq, also explaining that two of the three justifications
taken together are sufficient. The ECJ even appears to suggest that only one
of the two could suffice as well, by stating that “the two justifications put for-
ward must each be considered as being capable of justifying a restriction”.
71. C-231/05, Oy AA, Para. 54.
72. C-347/04, Rewe Zentralfinanz, Para. 43.
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earlier loss, as is confirmed by the OECD Commentary73
and can also be derived from Sec. 2a, Para. 3 of the Ger-
man Income Tax Code. Furthermore, even if Germany
was prevented from recapturing a loss following the tax
treaty, this argument should not be held sufficient to
justify a discriminatory treatment according to the ECJ’s
older case law. In Wielockx (C-80/94),74 the ECJ held
that a Member State cannot invoke the principle of
cohesion if it has waived its right to tax in a tax treaty.
Much as in Deutsche Shell, it was a unilateral decision
made by Germany to exclude foreign losses from the
right to a carry-forward, and not a necessary conse-
quence of the allocation of taxing power. Accordingly,
despite the ECJ’s decision to the contrary, the tax treaty
itself cannot provide an acceptable justification.
With regard to the second justification, there are two
observations to be made. First, it has been argued that
double use of losses of a PE is substantially different
from the problem of “loss trafficking” at issue in Marks
& Spencer and follows naturally from a PE’s status.75
Furthermore, the “rule-exception relationship” with
regard to foreign losses was argued to be quite the oppo-
site, making the ground of justification inapplicable to
the PE situation.76 Second, in applying the proportional-
ity test, the ECJ deviated from the Advocate-General’s
Opinion, and upheld the general applicability of its
Marks & Spencer ruling, according to which the state of
residence had to take foreign losses into account only in
a situation where the taxpayer could not obtain relief in
the state of source either in the same or in any future
period.77 As Lidl had already deducted the loss from
profits incurred by the PE in later years, the Marks &
Spencer criteria were not met and Germany was not
obliged to grant loss relief.78 As in Marks & Spencer, the
ECJ was not bothered by the remaining cash flow disad-
vantage for Lidl. This has correctly been criticized as
going too far. Apart from general observations,79 the
cash flow disadvantage may eventually equal a final loss
as the net value of the carry-forward tends towards
zero.80 However, the ECJ has consistently rejected argu-
ments based on a cash flow disadvantage in recent
judgements, leading Advocate-General Kokott to ques-
tion whether or not older case law in this respect was
still valid.81
It appeared to follow from the judgement that the dis-
tinction between temporary and final losses as allegedly
advanced by the ECJ in its decisions regarding foreign
subsidiaries must be fully applied to PEs as well.82 Still,
the ECJ had not explained in detail the essential features
of a “final” loss. Especially, it was unclear whether the
responsibility of the residence state may depend on the
loss carry-forward rules implemented by the source
state. This question was answered in Krankenheim in
the negative.
6. Krankenheim – Exploding theMyth of “Final
Losses”
In this case, the ECJ was again confronted with a ques-
tion to provide a preliminary ruling on German tax law
regarding foreign PE losses. Again, the facts were quite
simple. The German company Krankenheim Ruhesitz
am Wannsee Seniorenheimstatt GmbH (“Kranken-
heim”) carried out part of its business activities through
a PE situated in Austria. For the time the PE incurred
losses (1982 to 1990), Krankenheim was allowed a
deduction from its German profits under the exception
rule in Sec. 2a, Para. 3 of the German Income Tax Code.
After the PE turned profitable in 1990, Germany
included so much of the profits in the tax base in Ger-
many as to recapture the loss initially deducted, despite
the fact that Austrian domestic law did not allow the
losses incurred by the PE to be carried forward against
the same profit under its domestic law, leaving Kran-
kenheim with no loss relief in either Member State.
Krankenheim subsequently argued that the German
reintegration rule constituted an infringement of EC
law as it led to an unrelieved “final loss” for the com-
pany.
The ECJ decided to give its judgement without an Advo-
cate-General’s Opinion, apparently regarding the issue
as not involving a new question of law. The reasoning of
the ECJ, however, does not appear to be completely
flawless on several issues. In fact, the judgement appears
to be erroneous already at its outset, where the ECJ finds
the German rules to constitute a (discriminatory)
restriction of the company’s freedom of establishment.
The ECJ rightly observed that Germany granted the
same advantage of offsetting losses immediately to for-
eign and domestic branches. The Court then went on to
determine that Germany withdrew this advantage by
reintegration of losses in case of subsequent profits.
This is true, but it does not amount to a less favourable
treatment than that of domestic PEs, whose profits are
73. Para. 44 of the Commentary on Art. 23 of the OECD Model Tax Con-
vention.
74. Case C-80/94,Wielockx (11 August 1995), Para. 24 et seq.
75. Schön, supra note 9, p. 824 et seq.
76. Wolfgang Kessler and Rolf Eicke, “Cross-Border Loss Transfer After
Lidl Belgium”, Tax Notes International (2008), p. 645.
77. C-414/06, Lidl Belgium, Para. 47 et seq.
78. Id., Para. 53.
79. For example, Kessler and Eicke, supra note 76; Christoph Wattrin,
Ansas Wittkowski and Friederike Lindscheid, “EuGH: Keine Sofortverrech-
nung ausländischer Betriebsstättenverluste – Das Urteil in der Rs. Lidl Bel-
gium aus betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht”, Internationales Steuerrecht (2008), p.
639 et seq.; Christian Wimpissinger, “Cross-border transfer of losses, the ECJ
does not agree with Advocate General Sharpston”, EC Tax Review (2008), p.
173; Leclercq and Trédaniel, supra note 4, p. 240; and, in the same vein, see
Michael Tumpel, “Losses by Permanent Establishments in the European
Union”, Steuer und Wirtschaft International (2001), p. 58 et seq.
80. Englisch, supra note 30, p. 403.
81. Case C-282/07, Advocate-General’s Opinion, Truck Center (18 Septem-
ber 2008), Para. 48. However, it does not follow from that case that cash flow
disadvantages imposed on taxpayers by their home state are irrelevant from
an EC law point of view; if anything, it might follow that cash flow disadvan-
tages are insignificant where a non-resident taxpayer is subject to a different
mode of taxation than a resident taxpayer in the source state. This may be jus-
tified by the principle of territoriality as it concerns the source state. It cannot,
however, be justified by the same principle for the home state that taxes its
resident taxpayer’s worldwide income. See 1.
82. Compare Tom O’Shea, “ECJ Upholds German Loss Disallowance”, Tax
Notes International (2008), p. 1081.
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always taxed as a part of the company’s profits.83 The
less favourable result in the present case, if any,84 merely
followed from the fact that Austria did not grant a loss
carry-forward. Disregarding this fact, the ECJ, after
identifying discrimination, went on to search for a justi-
fication and accepted the need to guarantee the coher-
ence of the German tax system as applicable in this case,
as there was a:
direct, personal and material link between the two elements of
the tax mechanism at issue in the main proceedings, the said
reintegration being the logical complement of the deduction
previously granted.85
This once again clarifies the ECJ’s understanding of the
principle of fiscal cohesion and the requirement of a
direct link between a disadvantage and a corresponding
advantage conferred on the taxpayer through a Member
State’s legislation. In Deutsche Shell, the ECJ had denied
a direct link between currency losses and currency prof-
its. The difference to that decision, however, is clear (i.e.
the disadvantage of not taking a currency loss into
account occurred without any necessity of the existence
of currency profits). In Krankenheim, however, the
alleged disadvantage of taxing profits could only occur
in a case where, in previous years, a corresponding
advantage had already been conferred on the same tax-
payer. Consequently, the ECJ had no difficulties to con-
clude the restriction to be appropriate and proportio-
nate.
With regard to the previously discussed judgements, the
question arises how it is possible to reconcile the fact
that in Krankenheim allegedly a “final loss” came about.
First, the result is consistent with the ECJ’s reasoning in
Deutsche Shell, where it had explained that a Member
State cannot be required to:
draw up its tax rules on the basis of those in another Member
State in order to ensure, in all circumstances, taxation which
removes any disparities arising from national tax rules, given
that the decisions made by a company as to the establishment
of commercial structures abroad may be to the company’s
advantage or not, according to circumstances.86
The negative effect in question was a result of the lack of
coordination of the German and Austrian rules; insofar,
the ECJ correctly applied its reasoning from Deutsche
Shell.
It is less obvious, however, whether the judgement is
also in line with Marks & Spencer and Lidl Belgium. The
ECJ’s reasoning implies that a recapture rule like the
one implemented in German tax law was justified under
all circumstances. Following the common understand-
ing of its preceding case law, one would have expected
the ECJ to take a narrower view and disallow a recapture
in a case where there was no loss relief available in Aus-
tria (the “final loss” argument). By not doing so, the ECJ
apparently applied a different standard with regard to
proportionality of restrictive measures, without provid-
ing any explanation.
Fortunately, after having reached its conclusion, the ECJ
put forward an additional, more convincing argument
why Germany should win the case. In what appears to
be an obiter dictum, the ECJ went on to explain that,
even if the remaining disadvantage (of having an unre-
lieved loss) would constitute a restriction of the freedom
of establishment, this disadvantage would not fall under
the responsibility of the state of residence, but was
imputable only on Austria.87 Although convincing in its
result, the further remark of the ECJ that in this case the
“restriction would arise not from the tax system at issue
in the main proceedings, but from the allocation of tax
competences under the German-Austrian Agreement”88
cannot be supported. Indeed, the result would have
been the same if there was no treaty between Austria
and Germany. The restriction, therefore, cannot be a
consequence of the treaty’s existence. The truth is even
easier: the restriction in the case resulted from the Aus-
trian domestic tax rules.
This does not appear to be in line with Marks & Spencer
and Lidl Belgium, where the ECJ had held that the state
of residence was bound to take losses into account if the
taxpayer “has exhausted the possibilities available” to
have a loss relieved in the source state. The taxpayer in
Krankenheim could claim that they had.
Several solutions for this apparent inconsistency have
been brought forward in academic literature.
First, it has been argued that even though a contradic-
tion is found when comparing the outcome of Kranken-
heim to the wording used in Marks & Spencer, it only
serves to put the notion of “final losses” in more con-
crete terms, explaining that the criterion of “finality”
does not apply to a situation where loss relief is unob-
tainable in the source state because of its restrictive loss
relief provisions. Following this argument, a “final loss”
only entails a loss that cannot be relieved for factual rea-
sons.89 In the author’s view, this cannot be derived
directly from Krankenheim. The decisive factor in that
case was – and had to be, if understood correctly – solely
the German tax rule.
Second, it was submitted that the ECJ did not mean to
contradict its earlier judgements at all. It would appear
unlikely that the ECJ would change its mind within such
a short time, all the more without explicitly stating the
83. Werner C. Haslehner, “ECJ Judgment in the Wannsee Case compared
with AMID, Shell and Lidl Belgium – Permanent Establishment Losses Revis-
ited”, Steuer und Wirtschaft International (2008), p. 565; See also Meussen,
supra note 4, p. 362.
84. C-157/07, Krankenheim, Para. 18, in which the ECJ stated that in the
year in dispute (1994) Austria did not actually assess the profits of the com-
pany. It is, therefore, difficult to see where a disadvantage should have
occurred. The ECJ did not elaborate on this question, but assumed its exis-
tence. See Philipp Lamprecht, “Betriebsstättenverluste, Verlustvortragsrecht
und Aufteilung der Besteuerungsbefugnisse nach dem Urteil in der Rs. KR
Wannsee”, Internationales Steuerrecht (2008), p. 766.
85. C-157/07, Krankenheim, Para. 42 et seq.
86. C-293/06, Deutsche Shell, Para. 43, referred to by the ECJ in C-157/07,
Krankenheim, Para. 50.
87. C-157/07, Krankenheim, Para. 51.
88. Id., Para. 52.
89. See Lamprecht, supra note 84, p. 768.
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contradiction.90 According to this view, the responsibil-
ity of the residence state with regard to final losses is
shifted back on the source state where the finality is the
result of discriminatory provisions of the source state.
The promoter of this view finds the basis for this solu-
tion in the fact that the Austrian rules regarding loss
carry-forward have been widely accepted to be discrimi-
natory – a fact that might even explain why Austria, in
the end, did not actually take the profits from 1994 into
account.91 The author does not agree with this view for
two reasons. First, the ECJ had no power to examine the
compatibility of the Austrian rules with EC law in the
case, and indeed did not do so in its reasoning. Second,
this would be inconsistent with the “single-country
approach”92 normally adopted by the ECJ in examining
national legislation. The ECJ only asks whether or not
the Member State in question has implemented discri-
minatory rules. Whether or not this is the case cannot
depend on another Member State’s provisions.
O’Shea promotes a third explanation to reconcile the
judgements, based on the ECJ’s restricted competence
to alter domestic tax rules. He states that the ECJ “does
not have the power to tell the Member States to adopt
specific (tax) laws”, to explain why the Court accepted
the recapture rule to be a proportional rule in Kranken-
heim, but did not require the United Kingdom to adopt
such regime as a less restrictive measure in Marks &
Spencer.93 Not only would the author dispute this assess-
ment with regard to the ECJ’s power as being an issue.
There was no reason for the ECJ to “[impose] a recap-
ture mechanism to the residence state”,94 as this was of
no concern to the Court in any event. The ECJ simply
could have told the Member States to allow deduction
for the losses and clarified that they are allowed to
recapture the loss in later years. What is even more, that
view only explains why the ECJ accepted the cash flow
disadvantage in its judgements, but fails to explain why
in Krankenheim, the final loss did not amount to an
infringement. This argument, therefore, does not pro-
vide a clear resolution of the apparent inconsistency.
In the author’s view, the right way to reconcile the jud-
gements is a different and more formal one, and not
concerned with the problem of whether a loss in ques-
tion is merely “temporary” or “final”. There is an impor-
tant difference between Krankenheim and the preceding
judgements, which is unrelated to the question of tem-
porality and finality. The difference lies in the fact that
in Krankenheim, the German provisions were non-dis-
criminatory in the first place, whilst in Marks & Spencer
and Lidl Belgium the home state was applying discrimi-
natory rules. Consequently, even though an unrelieved
loss remained, it was clearly not the result of any wrong-
doing of the home state. In this respect, the solution is
the same as it should have been in AMID. The negative
effect in question in both cases should have been dis-
cussed as an issue of double taxation.95 According to the
ECJ’s settled case law, this only amounts to a mere dis-
parity and neither state can, simply because of its exis-
tence, be held responsible to avoid it.96 In the end, this
does not deviate too far from the first explanation, but it
results in a different outcome where, in the same situa-
tion asMarks & Spencer, the impossibility to get relief in
the residence state of the subsidiary stems from that
Member State’s law. In the author’s view, the United
Kingdom would still be required to take this “final” loss
into account. Following the explanation of Lamprecht,
it would not, which appears to be in contradiction to the
reasoning applied in Para. 55 of Marks & Spencer. The
same should – in the author’s opinion – apply with
regard to a “temporary” loss.
The abolition of the distinction between temporary and
final losses also appears to be an important issue for the
application of the case law to PEs in general. It is,
indeed, very difficult to determine when a loss incurred
by a PE turns out to be “final”, unless it follows from
restrictive loss carry-forward provisions implemented
by the source state.97 Neither the “disposal” nor the dis-
solution of a PE guarantees that losses cannot be taken
into account in later years.98 The only situation to be
aware of where there are no losses ever to be relieved in
the source state, which would be where the enterprise
itself is liquidated. It would be unsatisfactory to set the
limit for a “final” loss that far, though. In this situation,
it will often not be possible for the home state to take
the earlier loss into account either, unless the liquida-
tion brings about a profit.
7. Conclusions and Evaluation of ECJ Case Law
In drawing conclusions from the analysis provided in 2.
to 6., it appears best to start with setting out the current
state of the law as it can be derived from the ECJ’s judge-
ments. After that, a final critique of the case law will be
provided.
As the case law now stands, three principles can be
derived for the responsibility of the home state to give
relief for losses incurred by a foreign PE:
90. See Jens Knipping, “Zur Frage des Definitivcharakters ausländischer
Betriebsstättenverluste im Sinne des EuGH-Urteils in der Rechtssache Lidl
Belgium bei fehlender Möglichkeit eines interperiodischen Verlustausgleichs
im Betriebsstättenstaat”, Internationales Steuerrecht (2009), p. 276 et seq.
91. Lamprecht, supra note 84, p. 769.
92. Cordewener, Kofler and van Thiel, supra note 52.
93. O’Shea, supra note 82, p. 1080 and “German Loss Deduction and Rein-
tegration Rules and the ECJ”, Tax Notes International (2009), p. 969. In the
same vein, see Jérôme Monsenego, “Relieving Double Taxation: A Look at
Lidl Belgium”, Tax Notes International (2008), p. 415.
94. Monsenego, supra note 93, p. 415.
95. Haslehner, supra note 83, p. 568. See also Meussen, supra note 4, p. 362.
96. See 3. This result, of course, only holds true in assessing the German
rules at issue – it does not necessarily mean that there are no discriminatory
provisions in the other state, which in turn might be held responsible. But the
mere fact that a disadvantage persists, does not necessarily mean that some-
one has to be acting against the fundamental freedoms.
97. In addition, it can of course be argued – irrespective of C-157/07, Kran-
kenheim – that the source state rules should be disregarded to determine
whether a loss is “final”. See, in this respect, Kube, supra note 64, p. 310. See
also 7.
98. The problem there is that the loss carry-forward is not a right of the PE,
which does not constitute a taxable entity, but of the non-resident company
itself. Even if a PE is dissolved, there might still be a possibility for the enter-
prise to obtain loss relief in the source state. Compare also Meussen, supra
note 4, p. 363.
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(1) If the taxpayer is able to obtain relief in the state
where the PE is established in any later year, the
home state is not required to give any relief, if it
domestically applies a “symmetric” exemption
method. This follows from Lidl Belgium.
(2) If the home state follows the symmetric approach, it
must take a loss into account which, by its nature,
cannot be relieved in the source state. This can be
derived from Deutsche Shell.
(3) If the home state follows the asymmetric approach,
it may recapture a previously deducted loss even if
the source state does not provide for relief of the
same loss, as it was the case in Krankenheim. The
same is true – argumento a maiore ad minus – if the
source state does give relief.
These three principles lead to the next, so far unan-
swered question: whether the home state, when apply-
ing a symmetric exemption, is required to take a loss
into account that cannot be relieved under the source
state rules despite sufficient taxable profits to do so.
This cannot be answered from the ECJ’s reasoning in
Lidl Belgium or in Krankenheim, as it begs the question
whether a “final” loss, which has to be taken into
account following Marks & Spencer and Deutsche Shell,
can be created artificially by restrictive source state
rules. The only hint given by the ECJ so far can be seen
in Deutsche Shell, where it explicitly footed its argument
on the fact that loss relief could not be obtained because
of its nature. This implies that Germany would not have
been obliged to take a loss into account whose finality
was not a consequence of the very nature of it, but of the
particularities of the Italian loss relief rules. This assess-
ment is further strengthened by the statement in Para.
42 of that judgement, according to which Germany can-
not be required to take a loss into account “solely”
because it cannot be relieved in Italy. In Marks & Spen-
cer, however, the ECJ was not bothered with that criter-
ion; furthermore, if a “final loss” cannot follow from
restrictive source state rules, it will be extremely difficult
to find one in case of a PE, as both a sale and dissolution
of the PE do not necessarily lead to such final losses.
To sum it up, according to the ECJ’s rulings, a “final”
loss has to be relieved in the home state only if there was
no immediate loss offset in the year where it occurred.
With regard to “temporary” losses, such relief never has
to be given.
Two questions remain:
(1) Which criteria should a Member State apply in
devising a “recapture” rule, in order not to make it a
discriminatory treatment?
(2) How is “finality” of a loss to be determined?
With regard to the first question, it is the author’s view
that the reintegration of relieved losses does comply
with the fundamental freedoms as long as it guarantees
that it is based on the profitability of the foreign PE. In
that case, it cannot be found to be discriminatory, as it
only applies domestic treatment to the PE. In fact, the
ECJ’s argument of cohesion is not even necessary in this
respect. The only requirement for the home state is not
to tax results that would not form a taxable profit of
domestic branches. Accordingly, another open question
can be answered: whether the home state must calculate
the PE’s profits on the basis of its own or the source
state’s tax rules.99 Whilst it is acknowledged that apply-
ing the source state rules would have a greater chance to
avoid all disadvantages to the taxpayer, the home state is
free to apply its own rules, as it would still provide
“domestic” treatment. A remaining disadvantage100
would be the consequence of different rules to calculate
profits in the respective Member States and the resultant
(insignificant) disparity.
This solution also results in a balanced overall taxation
in both countries and – ideally – does not lead to an
unrelieved loss from the taxpayer’s perspective. Only in
a case where the source state does not provide for loss
relief, a disadvantage remains. Without prejudice to the
question of whether or not the source state infringes the
fundamental freedoms (which cannot be answered
without taking a look at the loss relief provisions applic-
able to a domestic enterprise in the source state), this
disadvantage is not a consequence of the home state
rules and thus cannot lead to the home state’s responsi-
bility. With regard to the disadvantage that arises to the
home state where no subsequent profit is attributable to
the foreign PE, this has to be seen as a logical conse-
quence of the principle of worldwide taxation applied to
resident companies, which cannot justify a discrimina-
tory treatment.
With regard to the second question, no clear answer can
be derived from case law. In the author’s opinion, the
more important question is why the ECJ restricts the
responsibility of the residence state to final losses, as
compared to how finality is to be determined. It should
be recalled that the ECJ regards denying immediate loss
offset as discrimination in the first place. It is only as a
matter of justification that it sets a limit to “final” losses.
This limit appears to come from the ECJ’s attempt to
find the right balance between the burden to be put on
the Member States and on the taxpayer. In this respect,
it is settled case law that the fundamental freedoms do
not prevent a cross-border investment of all possible tax
disadvantages.101 Still, it is not convincing to disregard
the remaining cash flow disadvantage completely and
deem it to be an issue that could only be prevented by
legislative measures at Community level. The power of
the ECJ is definitely sufficient to decide a justifiable
measure to be disproportionate if another less restrictive
measure can easily be found. Furthermore, it is uncon-
vincing to deem this an issue which is dealt with by the
Member States in their tax treaties: the Member States
do not require implementation of such discriminatory
treatment. It is true that the offset and/or recapture sys-
99. Compare Meussen, supra note 4, p. 363.
100. Arising, for example, in a situation where the home state tax rules lead
to calculation of a profit, whilst the source state rules result in a loss.
101. Case C-403/03, Schempp (12 July 2005), Para. 45.
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tem puts the Member States in the position of having to
face a cash flow disadvantage instead of the taxpayer. As
the burden cannot be eliminated completely in the light
of non-harmonized tax systems, the decision to be made
by the ECJ is who has to bear it. Is the taxpayer ulti-
mately responsible because he chose to invest in another
Member State and, therefore, has to bear all conse-
quences, even if they arise from discriminatory treat-
ment, or is the home state responsible, as it applies
discriminatory provisions? It appears unclear to the
author how the balance could be found in putting the
burden on the taxpayer in this situation. Since the
recapture rule would not have to depend on actual relief
given by the source state, the home state would not have
to take any additional loss into account where an overall
profit arises to the taxpayer.
In the author’s view, the distinction drawn by the ECJ
between “temporary” and “final” losses is thus unsatis-
factory; in both situations, a disadvantage may arise to
the taxpayer following discriminatory treatment by his
residence state and, so far, no convincing argument has
been advanced as a justification. The only relevant ques-
tion is whether or not the domestic provisions are dis-
criminatory in the first place. Accordingly, the ECJ was
right to dismiss Krankenheim’s claim even though it
could in the end not obtain any loss relief, whilst it was
(in the author’s view) wrong to do so in Lidl Belgium,
even though the claimant in that case could obtain relief
in later years. It should be concluded that, in applying
the exemption method, Member States should always
provide for immediate loss offset with a later recapture
of profits to comply with EC law.102
A final comment may be made on the idea of an alterna-
tive cross-legal form comparison. If one follows Advo-
cate-General Poiares Maduro’s reasoning to its very
end, at least in cases where a subsidiary can opt to be
treated like a PE (i.e. in a full consolidation group
regime), comparability would be established and, there-
fore, any loss of a foreign subsidiary would consequently
have to be treated the same as a loss of a foreign PE.103
Under a credit system, this automatically results in an
immediate loss offset, which may be recaptured by tak-
ing subsequent profits into account. Under an exemp-
tion system, the same result should apply. In order to
achieve this result, however, it has to be accepted that
the symmetric treatment of losses and profits as cur-
rently applied by several Member States in respect of the
exemption method constitutes an infringement of the
fundamental freedoms by denying multinational enter-
prises the cash flow advantage which is conferred on
merely domestic enterprises by their state of residence.
In the author’s view, this infringement should not be
regarded as justified on the grounds accepted in Lidl Bel-
gium for reasons of proportionality.
102. See also Confédération Fiscale Européenne, supra note 6, pp. 487-490.
103. Further insights into the issue of comparability of subsidiaries and PEs
are to be expected from the ECJ’s decision in Case C-337/08, X Holding (at
the time of the writing of this article, not yet decided). The situation underly-
ing the referral question involves a Netherlands parent company claiming the
right to offset its profits with its Belgian subsidiary’s losses – as it could do if
it was a PE.
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